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I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. asylum law should have protected Virginia Anikwata from
making a painful decision in May 1998. She had to leave her twelve-year
old daughter, Sharon, alone in the United States, or return with Sharon to
Nigeria to undergo female genital mutilation (FGM). If forced to return to
Nigeria, Anikwata would become the property of her in-laws. She and
Sharon would be forced into polygamous marriages. None of Anikwata's
previous requests succeeded in convincing the Immigration and
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Naturalization Service (INS) to call off her deportation. At the final hour,
she petitioned under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (the
Torture Convention).1 The fate of Anikwata and Sharon depends on the
Board of Immigration Appeals' (the BIA or the Board)2 upcoming decision
in In re Virginia Anikwata.3 The Board's judgment will reflect U.S.
immigration policy in two areas. First, the outcome will either reaffirm or
correct the critical failure of U.S. immigration law to protect a single
mother and her only daughter from the severe physical and psychological
hardship resulting from a forced separation. Second, the Board's holding
will determine whether the Torture Convention provides applicants an
alternative way to avoid deportation previously unavailable under asylum
law.
This Note is divided into five sections. Following this Introduction,
Section II reviews the procedural and substantive nature of Anikwata's
case. Section III argues that the competing interest of cultural autonomy is
outweighed by two factors. First, the United States must provide basic
human rights to women and children under domestic and international law.
Second, the sociological and medical dangers that FGM entails warrant
U.S. protection. Section IV theorizes how the BIA might have handled
Anikwata's case had FGM and polygamy been elements of an asylum
proceeding. This section criticizes how the BIA likely would have handled
the matter by analyzing the current state of asylum case law and the recent
changes to statutory law. Section V considers whether the Torture
Convention should protect Anikwata from deportation. This Note argues
that it is likely the Torture Convention argument will also fail before the
BIA. That Anikwata may not avoid deportation and be forced back to
Nigeria should prompt legislators to repeal the overly restrictive effects of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRAIRA). 4 Although IIRAIRA sought to reduce "real and perceived"
abuses of the asylum system, the law greatly restricts necessary safeguards
of U.S. asylum law.5 Most notably, the law permits family breakups more
easily despite evidence of extreme hardship. Legislators must also make
I U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
AIRESI39/708 (1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
2 The Board of Immigration Appeals is the top administrative review body in the
immigration system.
3 No copy of proceedings available yet.
4 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 to 3009-724 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (discussed in Section IV.A, infra).
5 IIRAIRA severely restricted U.S. policies toward legal and illegal immigrants. See,
e.g., Michele R. Pistone, New Asylum Laws: Undermining an American Ideal, 3 BENDER'S
IMMIGR. BULL. 496, 497 (1998) (providing examples which demonstrate the limitations of
the IIRAIRA).
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changes to asylum law to protect women and children like the Anikwatas.
who oppose forced marriage or forced FGM.
11. THE CASE OF ANIKWATA
Virginia Anikwata came to the United States in 1986 with her late
husband on his student visa.6 Her husband died in 1987, eight weeks after
their daughter Sharon's birth.7 Sharon is a twelve-year old U.S. citizen born
in Washington, D.C.8 Anikwata, 36, earned a licensed practical nurse's
certificate and worked in retirement and nursing homes. 9 Anikwata's status
in the United States changed from legal to illegal as a result of her
husband's death.10 From 1989 to 1990, Anikwata worked in childcare for a
family who sponsored her for a green card." In 1991, however, an INS
representative happened to knock on Anikwata's door in search of someone
else. 12 When Anikwata could not produce a greencard, the INS realized
Anikwata's status as an illegal alien and began its pursuit to deport her.
13
Anikwata received extensions in 1992 and 1993 before she was asked to
surrender herself for deportation.14 In 1994, Anikwata filed an affidavit
with the BIA that said her daughter would face hardship due to the laws and
customs of Anikwata's tribe in Nigeria.
Anikwata asserts that if deported to Nigeria, she and her daughter
would become the property of her late husband's family.15 They would be
6 See Dennis O'Brien, Nigerian Says Deportation May Endanger Her Daughter,
BALTIMORE SUN, May 29, 1998, at 7B.
7 See Sylvia Moreno, For Her Daughter's Protection: Nigerian Fights Deportation,
Fearing Mistreatment by Tribe, WASH. POST, May 27, 1998, at B1; O'Brien, supra note 6, at
7B.
8 See Sarah Pekkanen, Woman Fights Deportation to Nigeria, BALTimORE SuN, May 30,
1998, at 1A; see also All Things Considered: Asylum and Genital Mutilation (NPR radio
broadcast, May 27, 1998) available in LEXIS, News Library, SCRIPT File (noting that
Sharon does not want to move to her mother's home town in Nigeria, where she will have no
telephone, computer, and possibly not enough food).
9 See O'Brien, supra note 6, at 7B.
10 See Moreno, supra note 7, at B1.
I See id.
12 See id.
13 See Dorothy S. Boulware, Mother Fights Deportation to Save Daughter from Painful
Ritual, BALTIMORE AFRo-AM., June 12, 1998, at Al.
14 See id.
15 See id (noting that Anikwata could be forced to wed a brother-in-law and bear more
children because her husband's family refuses to release her and accept the refund of the
dowry).
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forced to abide by her in-law's tribal traditions of polygamous marriage,' 6
and Sharon would be forced to undergo FGM. 17 Anikwata states that she
has no relatives in the United States with whom she could entrust her
daughter if deported.
18
Anikwata qualified for a form of release called a "Suspension of
Deportation."' 19 She only had to prove that she had been in the United States
for at least seven years, had good moral character and that deportation
would prove to be an "extreme hardship" on Sharon.20 Under IRAIRA,
however, the issuance of an order to appear before an immigration judge for
removal proceedings ("Notice to Appear," formerly called an "Order to
show Cause") interrupted the requisite seven year period of residence,
precluding Anikwata's qualification for suspension.2'
Thus, all of Anikwata's previous attempts to legalize her residency in
the United States failed.22 In January 1998, 23 Anikwata filed a petition to
reopen her case on the grounds of political asylum.24 She wanted to argue
that the law protected her from deportation to Nigeria where she underwent
the "persecution" of FGM.25 Anikwata's asylum claim could only be
considered with the permission of the Baltimore INS district office or the
BIA, which rejected her claim. The INS claimed that Anikwata had many
16 See World Organization Against Torture USA, Submission in Support of Convention
Against Torture Petition and Interview of Virginia Anikwata, INS Case Number A70 505
637, at 5-6 (Nov. 30, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Submission].
17 See Pekkanen, supra note 8.
18 See id.
19 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(a) [hereinafter INA], 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)
(repealed 1996); infra Section IV(A).
20 See Boulware, supra note 13, at Al.
21 See Telephone Interview with Martha Saenz, Anikwata's original attorney (Mar. 5,
1999) (noting that although the Attorney General vacated In re N-J-B-, Interim Decision #
3309, (BIA 1997), which presumably would have permitted Anikwata's suspension,
Congress later codified the harmful decision as part of immigration law). See generally Lee
A. O'Connor, Suspension of Deportation after IIRAIRA and NACARA, 3 BENDER'S IMMIGR.
BULL. 1156 (1998) (exploring the possible effects of changes to the INA on currently
pending cases); infra Section IV (discussing new "Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment
of Certain Nonpermanent Residents").
22 See Hearing Scheduled in Deportation, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 2, 1998,
at A25.
23 Anikwata did not raise the FGM issue until January 1998 because FGM did not
become grounds for asylum until In re Kasinga, Interim Decision #3278 (BIA 1996). See
Telephone Interview with Martha Saenz, supra note 21. For more on Kasinga, see infra
section IV(B).
24 See Moreno, supra note 7, at B 1.
25 See id.
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opportunities to raise the FGM issue and did not merit any further
opportunities to evade deportation.2
On the brink of deportation, Anikwata filed a last minute petition
invoking Article III of the Torture Convention, which prohibits the
deportation of anyone who has experienced torture or cruel and inhuman
treatment or is likely to experience such treatment in the future.27 The INS
ordered a stay in deportation on May 28, 1998, the day after Anikwata filed
the Torture Convention petition.28 In September 1998, the BIA agreed to
hear Anikwata's petition for withholding of deportation in October 1998
based on the Torture Convention.29 Congress incorporated the Torture
Convention into U.S. law in October 1998.30 The law bars immediate
deportation for any non-citizen who files a claim under the Torture
Convention.31 The BIA will likely deport Anikwata because the INS fears
opening the floodgates to new asylum claims.
III. WOMEN'S RIGHTS VERSUS CULTURAL RITES
A. An Overview of Female Genital Mutilation
FGM includes any procedure involving partial or total removal of the
external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for any
purpose.32 Over two million girls are at risk of FGM annually.33 The
26 See Moreno, supra note 7, at BI (quoting an INS official as stating that "[a]ll the
information has been heard by an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals,
and they have found her claims have no merit"). But see Telephone Interview with Martha
Saenz, supra note 21 (arguing that Anikwata never eluded the INS; on the contrary, the INS
"tripped over her" when they knocked on her door in search of someone else).
27 See Sylvia Moreno, INS Frees Nigerian Woman During Appeal, WAsH. POST, May
29, 1998, at D3.
28 See Morton Sklar, New Convention Against Torture Remedies, 3 BENDER'S IMMIGR.
BULL. 651, 652 (1998) (noting that the remarkable turnaround in the INS's decision-making
demonstrates the growing importance of the Torture Convention).
29 See Sylvia Moreno, Woman to Get Hearing to Protect Daughter, WAsH. PosT, Sept.
28, 1998, at B6.
30 See Barbara Crossette, Mother Cites New U.S. Law on Torture to Fight Return to
Nigeria, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at A8 (discussing the Torture Convention's possible
impact on the Anikwata case).
31 See Sarah Wyatt, Deportation Target Fears Child's Mutilation, CHATTANOOGA FREE
PRESS, Dec. 6, 1998, at A4.
32 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION ET AL., FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A JOINT
WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA STATEMENT 3 (1997).
It is debated whether FGM is properly termed mutilation or circumcision. Dr. Sarah Maier, a
family practice resident at University Family Physicians/Smiley's Clinic in Minneapolis,
comments, "but in doing that [calling female circumcision "FGM"], we just continue the
victimization, because these women don't see themselves as having been mutilated." Kay
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practice is widespread among the illiterate and also common among the
educated. 34 A girl is typically subjected to FGM between the ages of one
week and fourteen years, and before the onset of menstruation.35 The
procedure is traditionally performed by female lay people.36 Some doctors
also perform FGM; however, few medical associations condone the
practice.37
FGM has four forms.38 Sunna ("tradition" in Arabic) involves the
excision of the prepuce, with or without excision of part or all of the
clitoris. Clitoridectomy, the most common procedure, accounts for 80% of
all operations.39 Clitoridectomy involves the excision of the clitoris with
partial or total excision of the labia minora.4° Additional cuts into the
vagina are added in some areas to make childbirth easier. Approximately
85% of all women who undergo FGM experience one of these two types.
4
Infibulation or Pharaonic circumcision, the third form, is practiced mainly
in the horn of Africa.42 Infibulation involves the stitching and narrowing of
Miller, Circumcision Ritual Creates Cultural Conflict for Somali Women, STAR TRIB., May
24, 1998, at Al. In contrast, Surita Sandoshan, Executive Director of the women's rights
group Equality NOW, argues that "[tihe term 'female circumcision' is a misnomer. This
practice ... involves the cutting of the clitoris and, in the more drastic forms, all external
genitalia. The male equivalent of even the less severe forms of FGM would be castration,
not circumcision." Surita Sandosham, Editorial, Defining Circumcision, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
28, 1995, at A20.
33 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION ET AL., supra note 32, at 5.
34 See Celia W. Dugger, Genital Ritual is Unyielding in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
1996, at A6.
35 See FAMILY LAw COUNCIL (AUSTRALIA), FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A REPORT TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 8 (1994).
36 See NAHID TOUBIA, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A CALL FOR GLOBAL ACTION 29
(1995).
37 See id.
38 Although the FGM procedure and its consequences are disturbing, it is important to
distinguish between the various forms of FGM and the different techniques involved as well
as their attendant consequences. See, e.g., Bernadette Passade Cisse, International Law
Sources Applicable to Female Genital Mutilation: A Guide to Adjudicators of Refugee
Claims Based On Fear of Female Genital Mutilation, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 429, 450
(1997) (arguing that "well-meaning articles emphasize the most shocking FGM practices
and consequently portray African parents as barbaric child abusers and African societies as
oppressors of women, without nuancing their analysis of FGM, perhaps for fear of providing
any arguments that might legitimize the practice").
39 See FRAN HOSKEN, THE HOSKEN REPORT: GENITAL AND SEXUAL MUTILATION OF
FEMALES 3 (4th ed. 1993); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION ET AL., supra note 32, at 5.
40 See HOSKEN, supra note 39, at 3.
41 See TOUBIA, supra note 36, at 10.
42 See Dugger, supra note 34, at A6.
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the vaginal opening by fastening together the bleeding sides of the labia
majora with thorns, catgut or sticky paste.43 A small opening is created by
inserting a splinter of wood to allow for elimination of urine and later
menstrual blood.44 "The legs of the child are then tied together,
immobilizing her for several weeks or until the wound is healed."45 Women
who are infibulated must be cut open to allow penetration and require
additional cuts when giving birth.46 The final form of FGM, "unclassified,"
includes such techniques as pricking, piercing or incising of the clitoris
and/or labia, stretching of the clitoris and/or labia, or cauterization by
burning of the clitoris and surrounding tissue among other procedures. 47
Although caused by factors besides FGM, it is notable that the highest
maternal mortality rates in the world are found in FGM-practicing areas.
48
All FGM operations are performed without anesthetic, typically on
"struggling children held down by force.., under highly septic conditions,
using a variety of tools. ' 49 Besides death from shock, bleeding or severe
infection, transmission of the HIV virus is also reported.50 Long-term
medical complications include genital malformation, delayed onset of
menstruation, chronic pelvic complications, recurrent urinary retention and
bladder infection, sexual frigidity and lack of libido.51 Psychological
complications include a sense of loss of femininity, depression, psychosis,
and a high rate of divorce.5 2 The pregnant victim of FGM faces various
obstetric complications, and her unborn baby may suffer injury or brain
damage as a result of a difficult birth.53 OtherIroblems involve psycho-
sexual, gynecological and urinary complications. For women who have no
43 See HOSKEN, supra note 39, at 3.
44 See iL
45 Id.; see also WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION ET AL., supra note 32, at 3 (describing
infibulation).
46 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION El AL., supra note 32, at 7.
47 See id. at3.
48 See HOSKEN, supra note 39, at 2.
49 Id. at 33.
50 See Dr. Muniini K. Mulera, Uganda: Let Government Ban Circumcision, AFR. NEws,
Aug. 3, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFRNWS File; see also Miller, supra note
32, at Al (noting that unsterilized razors, pieces of glass, knives and sharp stones may be
used on one girl after another, risking the transmission of infections, including AIDS).
51 See Mulera, supra note 50.
52 See id; see also Miller, supra note 32, at Al.
53 See Mulera, supra note 50.
54 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL-GHANA & ASSOCIATION OF CHURCH DEVELOPMENT
PRoJEcTs (ACDEP) IN NORTHERN GHANA, WORKING TOGETHER FOR CHANGE: STOP FEMALE
GENITAL MUTILATION 14 (1996) (noting marital conflicts due to sexual insensitivity,
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 32:101
one with whom to share their concerns, "their condition can progress to
psychopathological levels. 55
B. U.S. Commitments to Women's Rights Outweigh Cultural
Rites
That FGM has existed for over two thousand years raises the concern
that the United States may be pushing its own moral agenda on other
cultures.56 If that is the case, the INS might argue that Anikwata does not
merit a withholding of deportation because FGM is a legitimate, accepted
cultural practice and not torture.57 While universalists argue that
fundamental human rights norms transcend culture,58 cultural relativists59
maintain that defining FGM as "persecution" challenges the cultural
autonomy of FGM-practicing nations in Africa and the Middle East.6° The
United States rightly subscribed to the former theory, as evidenced by the
anxiety/psychosis; urinary problems include dribbling, inconsistency, poor flow, obstruction,
dysuria (painful or difficult passage of urine)).
55 TouBiL, supra note 36, at 19. For a brief discussion of the sexual and psychological
effects of FGM, see id. at 17-19.
56 Scholars believe FGM began in Egypt or the Horn of Africa more than two thousand
years ago, before the advent of Christianity or Islam. See Celia W. Dugger, Rite of Anguish:
A Special Report, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1996, § 1, at 1. Others have suggested that the ritual
dates back more than ten thousand years. See Miller, supra note 32, at Al. Slave girls in
ancient Rome were infibulated to prevent conception because childbearing would hinder
their work. See HOSKEN, supra note 39, at 74. In addition, "[w]hen excavating Egyptian
graves, archaeologists found mummies that were excised." See id.
57 See generally James T. Dixon, Bridging Society, Culture, and Law: The Issue of
Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 263 (1997) (containing a useful discourse
on the debate over FGM and the legal ramifications therefrom); see also Barrett A. Breitung,
Interpretation and Eradication: National and International Responses to Female
Circumcision, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 657, 659 (1996) (examining how a group of states
believe they can "outlaw a traditional practice that is both historically based and claimed as
vital to group integrity").
58 Shashi Tharoor indicates that just because something is a cultural tradition does not
mean it is positive, stating that, "[sllavery was part of world culture ...until it was
abolished." U.N.:DPI/NGO Conference Examines Universality of Human Rights in Context
of Diverse Cultures, M2 PRESswmE, Sept. 15, 1998, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
M2PW File.
59 "Cultural relativism can be described, in its simplest form, as the theory that there is
infinite cultural diversity and that all cultural practices are equally valid." Beth Ann Gillia,
Female Genital Mutilation: A Form of Persecution, 27 N.M. L. REv. 579, 579 n. 1 (1997)
(citing Katherine Brennan, The Influence of Cultural Relativism on International Human
Rights Law: Female Circumcision as a Case Study, 7 LAw & INEQ. J. 367, 370 (1989)).
60 See Linda A. Malone & Gillian Wood, In Re Kasinga, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 140, 142
(1997).
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adoption of its own anti-FGM law6' and its decision in the Kasinga
matter.62
The United States wisely promotes the protection of women and
children and rejects the parent's right to inflict FGM on their child.63
Naysayers argue that "[c]ircumcision in both males and females in Africa is
a mark of cultural identity" designating one's membership in one's tribe
and participation in its life and assumptions. 64 Moreover, "it is women
themselves who, having survived the procedures and all their attendant risk,
loss and pain, insist upon subjecting their small daughters to the same
operations." 65 However, some women practice the ritual as an escape from
61 See 18 U.S.C. § 116 (Supp. 1111997).
62 See infra Section IV (describing Board of Immigration Appeals' acceptance of asylum
claim based on fear of FGM). For a discussion of legal reactions to FGM by the West, see
generally Carol M. Messito, Regulating Rites: Legal Responses to Female Genital
Mutilation in the West, 16 IN PUB. INTEREST 33 (1997/1998).
63 The United States has signed many international treaties reflecting its commitment to
women's rights, children's rights and the eradication of FGM. See, e.g., Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res 180, U.N. GAOR,
34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) [hereinafter CEDAW];
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc A/48/49 (1993); Convention on
the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 61st plen. mtg., Annex,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25 (1989) [hereinafter Child Convention]; Report of the Fourth World
Conference On Women: Beijing 4-15 September 1995, United Nations Fourth World
Conference on Women, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (1995); International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No.
16, Annex, at 490, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217(A)(m), U.N. GAOR, 3d. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948); Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., at 20, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/24
(1993); Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence Against Women ("Convention of Beldm Do Pard"), June 9, 1994, 33 ]L.M. 1534.
64 Rev. Bonnie Shullenberger, Editorial, Africans View Circumcision as Rite, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 1995, at A26; see also Megan King, Western Intervention to Eradicate
Female Genital Mutilation: Balancing Effective Tactics While Mediating Cultural
Sensitivity (1997) (unpublished Senior Essay in Women's Studies, Brandeis University) (on
file with author) (examining inter alia the problem of respecting FGM as a cultural rite); L.
Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence in the
Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 275 (1997) (providing a
comprehensive analysis on issues related to FGM, its culture, and the West's relation to
Africa). For a useful bibliography treating FGM and human rights, see Rebecca J. Cook &
Valerie L. Oosterveld, A Select Bibliography of Women's Human Rights, 44 AM. U. L. REv.
1429, 1458-60 (1995).
65 Melvin Konner, Mutilated in the Name of Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1990, § 7
(Book Review Desk), at 5; see also Pamela Constable, A New Life and New Hope, WAsH.
PosT, June 11, 1998, at M5, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File, (noting
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male domination. In Sierra Leone, for example, "the rituals of genital
cutting persist because they are a rare female preserve in a society
otherwise heavily dominated by men."
Proponents of FGM might argue that it is impossible to convert
millions of people from performing a tradition practiced for thousands of
years. In the weeks after the Egyptian Health Minister banned FGM on
girls, for example, Egyptians continued the practice despite the threat of a
three-year jail sentence. 7 Nevertheless, recent reports suggest that the West
is influencing some African groups to abolish FGM.68 The Sabiny Elders of
Uganda, for example, converted themselves from proponents to opponents
of FGM by replacing FGM with a "symbolic ritual declaring the girl a
woman without maiming her for life.",69 Furthermore, a 1991 study
indicated that FGM is decreasing among certain sections of African
countries.7°
that Kasinga [discussed in Section IV infra] was protective of her uncle, who wanted her cut,
stating, "he is not a bad person; he was following what his ancestors did").
66 Howard W. French, The Ritual: Disfiguring, Hurtful, Wildly Festive, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
31, 1997, at A4.
67 See Neil MacFarquhar, Mutilation of Egyptian Girls: Despite Ban, It Goes On, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1996, at A3; Barbara Crossette, Court Backs Egypt's Ban on Mutilation,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1997, at A3; Scheherezade Faramarzi, 'It Won't Be Obeyed': Egypt
Officials Face an Uphill Battle to Enforce Ban on Female Circumcision, Ci. TRB., Mar. 7,
1999, § 13 (WomaNews), at ND2 (discussing difficulty of imposing court ban on FGM
throughout Egypt).
68 See, e.g., Erika Sussman, Contending with Culture: An Analysis of the Female Genital
Mutilation Act of 1996, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 193, 236-40 (1998) (noting that modem
efforts by the West to prohibit FGM date back to 1906 in Kenya, 1924 in the Sudan, and
1959 in Egypt).
69 Barbara Crossette, Sabiny Elders of Uganda Lead Women From Circumcision, CmI.
TRIB., Aug. 9, 1998, at 6; see also Vivienne Walt, Knowing Rite From Wrong: Senegal's
Villages Are Making a Healthy Leap Away From Old Traditions and Female Circumcision,
Cm. TRIB., Aug. 9, 1998, § 13 (WomaNews), at SDI (noting that in the last year, 44
Senegalese communities have declared an end to female circumcision and have begun
pressing others to join them); Dr. C6sar Chelala, New Rite is Alternative to Female
Circumcision, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 16, 1998, at A23 (announcing that a tribe in Kenya found
an alternative rite, known as "ntanira na mugambo" or "circumcision through words," which
includes a weeklong program of counseling and training for young women).
70 See Cdsar Chelala, An Alternative Way to Stop Female Genital Mutilation, 352
LANCET 126 (1998). A 1991 survey in Kenya showed that 78% of adolescents had
undergone FGM, compared with 100% of women older than fifty. In the Sudan, there was a
10% drop in its practice among women aged fifteen to forty-nine between 1981 and 1990.
See id; see also Gillia, supra note 59, at 589 n.68 (noting that Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt,
Ghana and the Sudan have outlawed or restricted FGM and citing Mary Ann James, Recent
Development, Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation: The Female Genital
Mutilation Act of 1993, H.R. 3247, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 206 (1994)).
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The adverse medical effects caused by FGM71 should convince any
legislator unfamiliar with the practice of its deleterious physical and
psychological effects.72 In fact, the dangers FGM involves overshadow
arguments that the United States is interfering with another country's
culture, especially where FGM is performed against its victim's will. The
health risks attendant to FGM favor an extra-sensitive immigration policy
when dealing with persons threatened by its practice. At the same time,
infibulation is much more dangerous to a woman's well-being than excision
or clitoridectomy, and presumably represents a stronger basis for asylum.73
"When health risk is cited as the major justification for eradication, the
arguments ring false in communities where clitoridectomy or excision is the
norm."
74
In addition to the medical justifications supporting Anikwata's right
to protect Sharon from FGM, Anikwata should emphasize both of their
rights to avoid forced polygamous marriages. The United States is a
signatory to several treaties supporting a woman's right to resist forced
marriage and sexual servitude. Under Article 16(1) of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, for
example, "[p]arties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations and in particular shall ensure ... [t]he same right to freely choose
a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent."75
71 See supra Section M1(A).
72 See In re Kasinga, Interim Decision #3278, at 14 (holding that FGM is meant to
manipulate a woman's sexuality in order to assure dominance and exploitation). The BIA
noted that FGM has been condemned by such groups as the United Nations, the International
Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics, the Council on Scientific Affairs, the World
Health Organization, the International Medical Association, and the American Medical
Association. See id.
73 Anikwata's tribe, the Ibo, located in southeast Nigeria, subject their female children to
excision and clitoridectomy. See HOSKEN, supra note 39, at 192. But see Letter from
Morton Sklar, Anikwata's attorney and Director of the World Organization Against Torture,
to James Lazarus (Feb. 17, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter 1] (noting that
because "different clans do different things," it is not known for certain what Anikwata
could expect).
74 TouBIA, supra note 36, at 16.
75 CEDAW, supra note 63, at 196 (emphasis supplied). Over fifty countries signed the
Convention, including the United States. See Billie Heller, International Convention On
Women's Rights: Bringing About Ratification In The United States, 9 WHrrrER L. Rnv. 431,
432 (1987) "'Signing' indicates basic agreement with the provisions of the document, and an
intention to secure ratification or accession to it by one's country." Id. But see Malvina
Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEo. WAsH. J. INTL L. & ECON. 49, 50 (1997) (noting
that the Senate has yet to ratify this most comprehensive Convention dealing with women's
rights).
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In addition, Article 2 of the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women states that violence against women shall be
understood to encompass sexual and psychological violence occurring in
the family, including dowry-related violence.76 Finally, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child requires its signatories to "take all effective and
appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices
prejudicial to the health of children., 77
Both Anikwata and Sharon are in danger of forced marriages if
deported to Nigeria.78 Anikwata's in-laws likely made a significant dowry
payment to Anikwata's parents upon her marriage. The high bride-price is
often based on whether the bride has been mutilated.79 Anikwata has stated
in an affidavit that upon returning to Nigeria, her in-laws will take Sharon
away from her - "that's the way the culture is." 80 While the Nigerian
government and constitution do not explicitly prohibit FGM nor condone its
practice, 81 the practice of polygamy is both de jure and de facto widely
accepted.82
76 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, supra note 63, art. 2.
Hillary Charlesworth has noted that:
The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women is an advance on
CEDAW's recommendations on violence because it is applicable to all members of the
United Nations. While General Assembly resolutions are not, strictly speaking, binding,
they are... at the very least.... an important statement of the international community's
views and contribute to the formation of customary international law.
Hillary Charlesworth, The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against
Women, AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. NEWSL., June 1994, at 1, 2.
The United Nations and the Organization of American States have declared private and
government violence against women a violation of international law. See Beth Stephens,
Humanitarian Law and Gender Violence: An End to Centuries of Neglect?, 3 HOFSTRA L. &
POLY SYMP. 87, 95 (1999).
77 Child Convention, supra note 63, art. 24(3).
78 "For a woman not to marry is still unthinkable in Africa and the Middle East ....
Polygamy is legal and practiced everywhere in the Middle East and Africa." HOSKEN, supra
note 39, at 321, 323.
79 See id. at 325.
80 All Things Considered: Asylum and Genital Mutilation, supra note 8.
81 See Zubair M. Kazaure, Editorial, Forced Circumcision is Alien to Nigeria, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 1994, at A20.
82 See supra note 39, at 321, 323; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH REPORT 1999 57 (1999) (noting that the rights of women in Nigeria are "routinely
violated").
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It is noteworthy that tribal or customary law,83 perhaps the most
pervasive law existing in Nigeria, supports the practice of polygamy and
FGM.84 The Oluloro immigration judge85 remarked that "although the
Nigerian government does not promote FGM, Nigerian State Department
reports indicated that FGM is ... common and is deeply ingrained in the
cultural tradition., 86 If forced to return to Nigeria, Anikwata can not be
expected to overcome such indoctrinated traditions and institutions.87 On
the contrary, Anikwata requires the support of the United States, an avowed
supporter of women's rights, human rights and children's rights.
IV. FAILURE UNDER DOMEsTIC IMMIGRATION LAW
Anikwata attempted to use different immigration procedures to dodge
deportation before relying finally on the Torture Convention. The BIA
refused to consider the issues of FGM and forced polygamous marriage
83 African customary law is a blend of African customs, imported colonial common and
civil law notions, and religious concepts from Christianity, Islam and traditional African
religions ....
... Customary law was not written and was interpreted solely by males during the
colonial era. Thus, the needs and opinions of females were completely ignored in the
interpretation of custom.
Fitnat Naa-Adjeley Adjetey, Reclaiming the African Woman's Individuality: The Struggle
Between Women's Reproductive Autonomy and African Society and Culture, 44 AM. U. L.
REv. 1351, 1365 (1995).
84 See Gregory A. Kelson, Granting Political Asylum to Potential Victims of Female
Circumcision, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 257, 286-87 (1995) (citing Linda Cipriani, Gender
and Persecution: Protecting Women Under International Refugee Law, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
511 (1993), and noting that although the Nigerian constitution could be interpreted to
prohibit female circumcision, the Nigerian government does not guarantee protection against
it).
85 See infra Section IV(A) (discussing the Oluloro case in more detail).
86 Kris Ann Moussette, Female Genital Mutilation and Refugee Status in the United
States -A Step in the Right Direction, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 353, 390 (citing In re
Oluloro, No. A72 147 491, at 16 (Mar. 23, 1994) (oral decision)).
87 To support this contention, the petitioner's memorandum argued:
The Nigerian Government supports, and will not take action against, the enforcement of
traditional laws by the family of Virginia's dead husband to inflict FGM on Sharon, and
to place both Sharon and Virginia in a position that amounts to sexual servitude based on
their gender ....
[]n the clan and village where Virginia and Sharon would be obliged to live [FGM]
exceeds 90%.
Submission, supra note 16, at 3, 4.
88 See Letter 1, supra note 73 (noting the same).
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until Anikwata's petition under the Torture Convention. This section
predicts, analyzes and criticizes the outcome of a hypothetical decision by
the BIA to consider the FGM and polygamy issues under U.S. immigration
law (specifically asylum laws). First, a procedural technicality imposed by
IRAIRA prevented Anikwata from raising a claim based on "exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship." 89 Ironically, Anikwata could easily have
met the substance of this test. Anikwata's case demonstrates the inability of
present law to address important humanitarian issues for immigrants not
meeting the overly restrictive legislative requirements of IIRAIRA. 9°
Second, this section posits that Anikwata's claim would have failed had the
BIA heard the FGM and polygamy issues under asylum law. The landmark
1996 Kasinga decision91 granting asylum to a refugee fleeing an FGM-
practicing country did not reach much beyond the facts of that particular
case. The BIA's likely decision not to grant Anikwata asylum had they
afforded her the opportunity to argue the claim demonstrates the inability of
immigration law to accommodate especially sensitive and urgent cases such
as this.
A. Parental Rights: "Exceptional and Extremely Unusual
Hardship"
Several procedures are available to illegal aliens to avoid deportation.
In cases involving separation between family members, petitioners often
employ a measure called "suspension of deportation" because of the
"extreme hardship" standard available under that statute.92 Under IIRAIRA,
however, Congress amended the statute for illegal immigrants. The new
"Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Nonpermanent
Residents" (Cancellation) 93 calls for "exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship" to reduce the pool of qualified applicants.94 The full statute
requires that the applicant be present in the United States for at least ten
years, be a person of good moral character, remain clear of certain offenses,
and establish the extremely unusual hardship to his child who must be a
U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident. 95 The applicant's hardship is no
89 See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
90 See generally Pistone, supra note 5, at 496-97 (discussing the harshness of IRAIRA).
91 See discussion of In re Kasinga, infra Section IV(A)(1) (restricting FGM-asylum
grants to persons in nearly identical circumstances as petitioner ).
92 See INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(repealed 1996); IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION
LAW SOURCEBOOK 688 (6th ed., 1998); see also Submission, supra note 16, at 8 (noting
other federal immigration statutes and agency rules protecting the unity of the family).
93 See INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (1994); 8 C.F.R. §§ 240.11(a), 240.20 (1999);
KtJRZBAN, supra note 92, at 698.
94 KuRZBAN, supra note 92, at 702 (emphasis supplied).
95 See id. at 699.
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longer considered under the new test.96 In addition, Anikwata could not
have invoked this new procedure because "the commencement of removal
proceedings terminates continuous physical presence. ' 97
The INA ironically states that being a "practicing polygamist"
precludes someone from possessing "good moral character.,, The INS
views the act of polygamy so critically as to preclude cancellation of
deportation. It seems odd that the INS will not apply this same value
judgment to Anikwata's case, in which she seeks protection from the very
practice the INS denounces in this statute. In any event, Anikwata would
easily have fulfilled this portion of the test. Anikwata became an upstanding
member of American society immediately upon entrance into the United
States. She worked nights in order to spend time with her daughter during
the day and is a model parent intimately involved in her daughter's daily
life.99 The immigration judges' permitted use of discretion on this portion
of the testl °° would have resulted in a favorable decision for Anikwata.
Despite this new and limiting Cancellation standard faced by
petitioners, cases turning on the pre-1996 criteria are still instructive in
assessing whether Anikwata's forced separation from Sharon could qualify
as hardship on Sharon. 101 In re Oluloro,1°2 for one, demonstrates how
immigration judges have protected the right of children not to be separated
from their parents because of the "extreme hardship" separation produces.
In this matter, an Oregon judge held that a Nigerian illegal alien could
remain in the United States rather than face deportation. 03 Deportation
would have meant leaving her two American-born daughters in the United
States with her abusive husband rather than taldng them back to Nigeria
where they would be forced to undergo FGM.104 Although the court's
ruling holds less precedential value since the INS did not appeal the
96 See id. at 701.
97 O'Connor, supra note 21, at 1157 (citing INA § 240A(d); see supra Section I (noting
that INS initiated removal proceeding against Anikwata).
98 See KURZBAN, supra note 92, at 679 (referring to INA § 212(a)(10)(A)). For a
description of the discretionary and statutory grounds for ineligibility, see id.
99 See Submission, supra note 16, at 9 (stating the same).
100 See KuRZBAN, supra note 92, at 679 (citing Matter of Turcotte, 12 L & N. Dec. 206
(BIA 1967), a precedent discretion case).
101 See id. at 702.
102 See Patricia Dysart Rudloff, In re Oluloro: Risk of Female Genital Mutilation as
"Extreme Hardship" in Immigration Proceedings, 26 ST. MARY'S L. J. 877, 877 (1995)
(citing In re Oluloro, No. A72 147 491 (Wash. EOIR Immigr. Ct. Mar. 23, 1994)
(unpublished transcript of oral decision on file with St. Mary's Law Journal)).
103 See id. at 878.
Io4 See Nigerians Spared Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1994, at A19.
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decision, 105 the holding and reasoning of the matter should persuade
immigration judges to consider humanitarian factors in cases with
comparable fact patterns.
Some courts have held that choosing to leave a citizen child behind in
the United States does not constitute the requisite hardship because the INA
does not compel the alien to make such a choice.1°6 However, the hardship
test does apply to the citizen child if taken to the parent's country1 °7 In In
re Ige, the Board rejected a Nigerian couple's argument that their children
would face extreme hardship by remaining in the United States.10 8 The BIA
stated, however, that "[aissuming a United States citizen child would not
suffer extreme hardship if he accompanies his parent abroad, any hardship
the child might face if left in the United States is the result of parental
choice, not of the parent's deportation." 1°9 In the Anikwata matter,
Anikwata does not assume that bringing her daughter to Nigeria would not
qualify as extreme hardship. In fact, it would qualify as torture.'10 The Iges'
concern over their two boys, ages seven and one, did not reach the same
dimensions as Anikwata's concern over her twelve-year old daughter.
The court in Bastidas v. INS"ll found that where a father expresses a
deep affection for his child based on his actions, the court will not accept a
finding of no "extreme hardship" unless other circumstances mandate
otherwise.112 In that case, the petitioner's legal status terminated as a result
of a divorce from his American wife. The court recognized that the
petitioner loved his son based upon the time the two spent together. The
immigration judge granted Bastidas the right to avoid "extreme emotional
hardship" by preventing his deportation.11 3 In Anikwata's case, Sharon has
lived with her mother since her father's death, and would endure
psychological devastation upon losing her other parent at such a young
105 See Rudloff, supra note 102, at 878 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1994), which states that
"selected decisions designated by the Board shall serve as precedents in all proceedings
involving the same issue or issues"); see also Timothy Egan, An Ancient Ritual and a
Mother's Asylum Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at A25, available in LEXIS, News
Library, NYT File.
106 See KURZBAN, supra note 92, at 703 (citing In re Ige, 20 I. & N. Dec. 880 (BIA 1994).
107 See In re Ige, 20 L & N. Dec. 880, 885 (BIA 1994).
108 See id. (holding that parents would not undergo extreme hardship by leaving their
children in the United States where children could accompany parents to Nigeria without
harm).
109 Id. at 880 (emphasis added).
110 See discussion infra Section V.
III Bastidas v. INS 609 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1979) (recognizing parent-child bond as basis
for extreme hardship).
112 See id. at 105.
113 See id. at 106.
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age." 4 In short, the defunct standards applied in these cases that protected a
parent's right to avoid separation from her child deserve preservation, for
these standards safeguard valuable family bonds. 5 At any rate, the
circumstances of Anikwata's case are so extenuating that Sharon would
have met the more burdensome "exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship" standard.
B. Asylum Law: Meeting the Refugee Act Test
If the applicant fails to achieve a Cancellation, she may try for a
"Withholding of Removal '" 6 as set out in INA section 241(b)(3)1 7 or a
grant of asylum.'1 8 In order to qualify for asylum," 9 the applicant must
meet the definition of a "refugee" under the 1980 Refugee Act,' 20 which is
part of the INA. The INA defines "refugee" as someone who cannot return
114 See Submission, supra note 16, at 2.
115The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the importance of strong family bonds in
American ethos. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
116To qualify for Withholding of Removal (formerly called "witholding of deportation"
under INA 243(h)), the court must find a "clear probability of persecution" on one of the
five bases under the Refugee Act (discussed infra). See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30
(1984) (laying out the standard); see also Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 641 (8th Cir. 1994)
(noting that the standard for withholding deportation is more difficult to meet than the "well-
founded fear" standard applicable to asylum").
117 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (Supp. IH 1997).
118 See Rudloff, supra note 102, at 899 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(A)(42) (1988)).
119 Note that asylum is broken down, among other ways, into "affirmative asylum" and
"defensive asylum." "Affirmative asylum" means the individual seeks asylum immediately
upon entering the United States, whereas "defensive asylum" is a defense to removal from
the United States. See Gillia, supra note 59, at 590 n.71.
12 0INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(1994); see, e.g., In re Kasinga,
Interim Decision #3278, at 25 (BIA 1996) (Lory D. Rosenberg, concurring) (noting that
1980 Refugee Act sought to establish compliance with this country's domestic and
international humanitarian obligations under the following two U.N. conventions: the 1967
U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967 [1968] 19 U.S.T 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 and the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150); see also Federation for American Immigration
Reform, Refugees and Asylum (visited Oct. 23, 1998)
<http'.//www.fairus.org/04138705.htm>.
The distinction between a refugee and an asylee is that the former applies for entry to the
United States from abroad, and the latter is already in the United States, legally or
illegally when the application is made ....
In practice, a majority of the asylum applications each year are 'defensive' applications
filed by deportable clients attempting to use asylum as a means to avoid deportation.
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to their home country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. 1
1. "Social Group"
The Kasinga Board held that the practice of FGM may form the basis
for a claim of persecution under the Refugee Act; 22 and that members of
the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not been subjected to FGM as
practiced by that tribe, and who oppose that practice, are recognized as
members of a particular "social group" within the definition of the term
"refugee" under section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA.1 3 In that matter,
Kasinga fled from Togo to the United States to avoid FGM and spent
sixteen months in a U.S. prison before the BIA granted her petition for
asylum based on the fear of FGM.
24
Although this landmark decision signaled a major step forward for
women's rights and human rights, the decision also limited future FGM-
related petitions like Anikwata's. The BIA, for example, narrowly tailored
the definition of social group to the facts of that case.125 Applying the
narrow Kasinga definition of social group to the Anikwata matter would
bar Anikwata from succeeding in an asylum claim. The accepted INS
formulation of social group excluded previously circumcised women
because "a woman once circumcised cannot ordinarily be subjected to FGM
a second time.' 26 In addition, the BIA failed to protect any woman who
lives in an FGM-practicing society as a member of "some other social
121 See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985) (demonstrating the same), overruled
in part on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
Race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion as
an exclusive list says something about the world in 1951. It also says something about
those who were negotiating the refugee compacts, whose ideas have come under
increasing pressure and scrutiny in terms of development in society, and about the world
since then.
Arthur C. Helton, Keynote Address delivered for Symposium, Shifting Grounds for Asylum:
Female Genital Surgery and Sexual Orientation, 29 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 467, 471
(1998).
122 See In re Kasinga, Interim Decision #3278, at 125 (BIA 1996).
123 See generally Malone & Wood, supra note 60 (discussing interpretation of social
group in Kasinga).
124 See Evelyn C. White, Escape From the Knife, S.F. CHRON., March 15, 1998, at 3,
available in LEXIS, News Library, SFCHRON File (book review) (describing the
deplorable conditions Kasinga and refugees face in U.S. prisons).
125 See Malone & Wood, supra note 60, at 143.
126 Id. at 145 (citing 1996 WL 379826, L. Flippu & M. Heilman, Concurring, at 1).
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group."'127 The BIA intentionally engineered an overly fact-specific
standard to avoid the possibility of inviting immigrants like Anikwata from
flooding the INS with new bases for asylum. The Board might argue, for
example, that granting asylum to women who previously underwent FGM
would invite millions of women to further stretch the generous standard
based on other forms of past mistreatment.'2 Furthermore, by expanding
the scope of a "well-founded fear of persecution" to non-traditional areas,
objective decision-making on a case by case basis could become an
expensive, unmanageable process. 129 While the INS fears can be
appreciated, 130 the more pressing issue concerns how asylum law can
protect applicants whose exceptional circumstances call for compassion. 131
In defining "social group," the oft-cited Acosta court held that a
Salvadoran alien who fled his home country because of the threat to taxi
drivers did not qualify for asylum. 132 The court found that "taxi drivers"
failed to satisfy the "social group" requirements because being a taxi driver
is not an immutable characteristic. On the contrary, Acosta could have
switched trades or moved to a different city,134 thereby avoiding
127 See id. at 146-47 (noting that "[w]ith its [the Board's] emphasis ... on the extreme
form of genital mutilation ... as well as its definition of the social group with reference to
opposition to the practice, the majority opinion... provides implicit support for a number of
the INS's limiting formulations").
128 See, e.g., Sharon Nichols, American Mutilation: The Effects of Gender-Biased Asylum
Laws on the World's Women, 6 KAN. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 42, 50 (1997) (citing Jennifer
Bingham Hill, Battered, Raped, and Veiled: The Sanctuary Seekers, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 20,
1994, at 26).
129 See Lena H. Sun, INS Expands Asylum Protection, WASH. POST, June 3, 1995, at A4
(quoting Dan Stein, president of the Federation for American Immigration Reform [FAIR]
as stating, "[w]e cannot bring people here simply because they are suffering under general
cultural forms of oppression"). But see infra text accompanying note 188.
130 See Telephone Conversation with Martha Saenz, supra note 21 (noting that the INS
will delay as long as they can because they worry about what the decision would lead to).
131 See, e.g., Arthur C. Helton & Alison Nicoll, Female Genital Mutilation as Ground for
Asylum in the United States: The Recent Case of In Re Kasinga and Prospect for More
Gender Sensitive Approaches, 28 CoLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 375, 387-88 (1997) (arguing
that rather than seek to keep immigration levels down, asylum law should ensure the
protection of refugees under international treaties and the Immigration and Nationality Act).
132 See In re Acosta, 19 1 & N. Dec. at 211, 236-37.
133 See id at 234.
134 Cf. Mensah v. Minister For Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997), No. BC9705791,
1997 AUST FEDCT LEXIS 893, at *17 (noting that FGM had been illegal in Ghana and
that a person would be able to seek protection locally or at least by relocating to another part
of the country); see also Bernadette Passade Cissd, Panel: Female Genital Surgery, in
Symposium, Shifting Grounds for Asylum: Female Genital Surgery and Sexual Orientation
29 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 467, 485 (suggesting that "[aidjudicators may argue that the
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endangerment to his life. Anikwata could successfully respond to such
arguments, however. 135 Anikwata cannot change her predicament as a
widowed Nigerian woman of the Ibo tribe-characteristics that qualify her
to enter a forced polygamous marriage and become the property of her in-
laws. In addition, Anikwata's in-laws hold an interest in Anikwata and
Sharon as chattels;1 36 thus, Anikwata's in-laws would have good reason to
locate her once they realize she returned to Nigeria. Moreover, Anikwata
"has no connections or means of support ' 137 anywhere in Nigeria except the
village where her in-laws reside. In short, the outcome of an asylum petition
would depend principally on the BIA's more expansive interpretation of
"social group" to include categories like "monogamous women in
polygamy-practicing countries" or "women objecting to their daughters'
subjection to FGM. ' 38
2. "Well-founded Fear of Persecution"
To establish a well-founded fear of persecution and obtain asylum the
petitioner must demonstrate a "subjectively genuine" and "objectively
reasonable" fear of persecution on account of political opinion or
membership in a particular social group. 139 The INS would probably debate
the veracity of Anikwata's subjective fear because she waited a few years
group practices FGM and is in, for example, southern Nigeria; why can't the applicant go to
northern Nigeria to obtain protection there?").
135 The U.N. Handbook employed by Us in decision-making states that a country-wide
threat need not be evidenced in every case in order to avoid deportation. See Robert B. Jobe,
Establishing the Threat of Persecution on a Country-Wide Basis in [1994-1995] 2 IMMIGR.
& NATIONALITY L. HANDBOOK 610, 617 (noting that that United States has described the
Handbook as "a significant source of guidance" in construing the Refugee Convention and
Protocol, even though it is not binding on adjudicators).
136 See Submission, supra note 16, at 5 ("[U]nder the custom and practice of her clan and
village, the husband, and the husband's family on his death, are deemed to have ownership
rights over wives and female children").
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that, "[a]lthough
social group membership has increasingly been invoked as the basis of asylum claims, the
meaning of 'social group' remains elusive," resulting in courts applying the term
"reluctantly and inconsistently"). But see Karen Musalo, Ruminations on In Re Kasinga:
The Decision's Legacy, 7 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 357, 361-62 (1998)
(acknowledging that since the Kasinga decision, at least four INS cases have permitted
women who already underwent FGM to remain in the United States because inter alia they
"had female daughters who they were trying to protect from the procedure").
139 Pitcherskaisa v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 643-46 (9th Cir. 1997) (asserting that political
opinions promoting support of lesbian and gay civil rights in Russia, and membership in
social group of Russian lesbians constituted "well-founded fear").
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before raising the FGM and marriage issues. 4° Anikwata could respond
that American law did not recognize FGM as a basis for asylum until the
1996 Kasinga decision, so she never knew to raise the FGM issue.
Moreover, it is not difficult to believe a widower who says she does not
want to become her in-laws' property, subject her daughter to FGM, and be
forced to marry her late-husband's brother.
The In re Mogharrabi decision laid out the objective component in a
four-part test similar to Acosta in refining what constitutes a "well-
founded" fear: (1) The alien possesses a characteristic a persecutor seeks to
overcome by punishing the individuals who possess it, (2) the persecutor is
aware that the alien possesses this characteristic, (3) the persecutor has the
capability of punishing the alien, and (4) the persecutor has the inclination
to punish the alien. 141
Anikwata's widowhood is the characteristic her persecutors seek to
overcome. Anikwata's persecutors, her in-laws, will want to punish
Anikwata whether or not she returns with Sharon. 142 If Anikwata returns
with Sharon, she will be blamed and punished for her late husband's
death. 143 As "a sign of respect and allegiance to her dead husband," she will
be forced to become the sexual partner of males in her in-laws' family.144 If
Anikwata returns without Sharon, she will be punished for denying her in-
laws their traditional property rights over Sharon and for not preventing her
husband's death. 145 Thus, Anikwata could meet the requirements of this
four-part test. Her greatest difficulty would entail convincing the BIA that
forced polygamous marriage constitutes "persecution."' 46
"Well-founded fear of persecution" under the INA statute should
include a fear of living in a society that perpetuates the subordination of
140 See All Things Considered: Asylum and Genital Mutilation, supra note 8 (stating the
same); Emily Barker et al., The Public Sector, AM. LAW, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 64, 79 (quoting
Kasinga's lawyer, Karen Musalo, as stating, "The hardest thing to establish is that your
client is telling the truth."); see also Barry Graham, Blade Runner, PHoENIx NEw TIMES,
Apr. 16, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Phoenix New Times File (noting the
coincidence that just when a Nigerian illegal alien had been on the fringe of deportation, she
conveniently received a letter telling her that her child would be in danger of FGM if the
deportation occurred).
141 In re Mogharrabi, I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (BIA 1987).
142 See Submission, supra note 16, at 2.
143 See id.
144Id.
145 See id.
146 See Ciss6, supra note 134, at 486-87 (positing that more flexibility is needed in
determining bases for "fear of persecution" in FGM asylum cases). "[I]ndividuals who have
a common characteristic that they should not.., be asked to change... fall under this
construction of social groups." Id (emphasis added).
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women.147 The BIA has yet to extend the principles set forth in Kasinga to
claims involving women who have already undergone FGM.148 Women
who once lived in FGM-practicing countries had far fewer human rights
than afforded to them in the West. r49 "A mutilated woman... may have a
well-founded fear of persecution if such persecution includes
perpetuat[ing] the ideology of women being subordinate to men . . . by
forcing [them] to return to their homelands.' 50 For Anikwata, attending
school and establishing a career in the United States accustomed her not
only to an improved standard of living, but also to improved treatment as a
woman and a human being. In contrast, Anikwata's deportation to Nigeria
would reduce her status dramatically.' 5
V. ENTERING THROUGH THE SIDE DOOR: THE U.N. CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE
The Torture Convention, 152 adopted by the United States in 1994 and
implemented as part of the INA in October 1998, 53 could not have come at
a better time for immigration lawyers. Immigration lawyers are still
unraveling the wave of restrictive legislation passed under IIRAIRA,'s 4
which explains in part why Anikwata's asylum petition failed. 15 Attorneys
now increasingly look to the Torture Convention as an alternative "side
door" into the United States for otherwise ineligible applicants. 156
147 See Amy Stem, Female Genital Mutilation: United States Asylum Laws are in Need of
Reform, 6 Am. U. J. GENDER & L. 89, 90 (1997) (stating the same).
148 But see Musalo, supra note 138, at 361-62 (noting INS cases permitting women who
already underwent FGM to avoid deportation because of the danger placed on their
daughters).
149 See generally, HOSKEN, supra note 39, at 317-25 (discussing the status of women in
FGM-practicing countries).
150 Stem, supra note 147, at 90.
151 See id.
152 For full title, see supra note 1.
153 See Crossette, supra note 30, at A8 (discussing the Torture Convention's possible
impact on the Anikwata case).
154 See supra Section IV(A).
155 For explanation of why the IRAIRA did not apply to Anikwata, see supra Section
IV(A).
156 The first action in which the INS granted protection under the Torture Convention
involved an ethnic Kurd who lost his asylum case and waived his right to appeal. See
Protection Granted Iraqi Under U.N. Convention Against Torture, 3 BENDER'S IMMIGR.
BuLL. 549 (1998) (discussing the decision involving an Iraqi army deserter who was
severely beaten and tortured before escaping to Iran in 1994); see also Letter from Morton
Sklar, Director, World Organization Against Torture USA to James Lazarus (Feb. 12, 1999)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Letter 2] (stating that "there are really important cases and
issues presented, including the protection of victims of rape, domestic violence, persecution
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In Anikwata's case, for example, the INA would probably not permit
asylum because Anikwata did not match one of the five categories under
the Refugee Act test. 157 Alternatively, the Torture Convention does not
require that any of the five elements of the Refugee Act (political opinion,
race, religion, nationality, or social group) be present. 15 8 Thus, even if the
BIA rejected Anikwata's argument that she fits the "gender" social group
category created by Kasinga, Anikwata could still persuade the BIA under
the Torture Convention. 
159
In addition, unlike under asylum law, no previous removal orders or
criminal record can proscribe an applicant from the reaches of the Torture
Convention. 16° The statute reads: "It shall be the policy of the United States
not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the
person would be in danger of being subjected to torture., 161 The
implementation of the statute by the INS through rulemaking indicates that
the worst of criminals, including alien terrorists and persons who engaged
in genocide, may avail themselves of the Torture Convention.' By
comparison, Anikwata's illegal ten-year stay in the United States should not
prevent access to the Convention. Moreover, the INS may not invoke the
based on sexual orientation, and other grounds that fall outside the traditional asylum case").
But see Jenna Greene, Making A New Case For Asylum, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 11, 1999, at 2
(noting that unlike applicants invoking the Torture Convention, refugees petitioning under
asylum law can obtain permanent residence and citizenship); Sklar, supra note 28, at 655-56
(noting that stay of removal, the only recourse under the Torture Convention, can leave the
applicant in a "strange netherwold" if some form of proper legal status cannot be obtained).
157 See supra Section IV(B).
158 Cf Kristen B. Rosati, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Self-
Executing Treaty That Prevents the Removal of Persons Ineligible for Asylum and
Withholding of Removal, 26 DENy. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 533, 540-41 (1998).
159 See, e.g., Debra Baker, New Ground for Asylum?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1998, at 32 (noting
that Morton Sklar, Anikwata's lawyer, does not think that her case falls within one of the
five asylum categories); see also Ginger Thompson, No Asylum for a Woman Threatened
With Genital Cutting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, at A35, 41 (discussing case in which
woman from Ghana could not gain asylum because FGM in Ghana "would be imposed as a
matter of individual punishment, rather than as a matter of general practice imposed on a
particular social group").
160 See Greene, supra note 156, at 2.
161 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §
2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681-822 (1998). Thus, while granting asylum is discretionary, the
Torture Convention protection is mandatory. See Interim Rule Issued for Claims under
Convention Against Torture, 4 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BuLL. 256, 257 (1999).
162 See Eligibility for Protection under the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8496
(1999)(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 507.1); Regulations Concerning the Convention Against
Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, 8478-79 (1999).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
more restrictive Cancellation procedure as a way to accelerate her
removal. 163
The Torture Convention, as enacted by Congress in the Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998,164 requires agencies to "implement
the obligations of the United States under Article 3 of the United Nations
Convention Against Torture or Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment." 165 Three basic requirements must be
fulfilled to qualify under the Torture Convention. First, the petition must
involve severe pain and suffering. 166 Second, the torture must involve a
public official. 167 Third, the torture must be inflicted intentionally.
168
Whether Anikwata left Sharon behind in the United States and is
forced to marry one of her in-laws or brings Sharon to Nigeria to undergo
FGM, Anikwata satisfies the "severe pain and suffering" requirement.
Recall Section IV's argument that Anikwata could have met the new, more
restrictive "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" requirement under
the Cancellation standard for illegal immigrants. Here, too, the unsettling
suggestion that Anikwata either (1) subject her daughter to FGM and both
herself and her daughter to forced marriages or (2) abandon her daughter,
whom Anikwata alone has raised over the past eleven years, qualifies
Anikwata as meeting the Torture Convention's gentler "severe pain and
suffering" language. Moreover, the torture may be inflicted as punishment
for an act Anikwata is suspected of committing. 169 Anikwata's in-laws will
rape her as a sign of respect to her dead husband's family. 170 This
consequential mistreatment amounts to punishment.
Although the current law fails to mention "rape!' and specifically
precluded from the definition "lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment that do not amount to torture,"171 it is arguable that Congress
meant to include rape as torture. The current definition of torture is subject
163 See supra Section IV(A); see also Rosati, supra note 158, at 540 (discussing the
same).
164 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §
2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681-822 (1998).
165 Id.
16 6 See Implementation of the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8490 (1999)(to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.18); see also Kristen B. Rosati, The United Nation Convention
Against Torture: A Detailed Examination of the Convention as an Alternative for Asylum
Seekers, 3 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BuLL., 183, 185 (1998).
167 See id.
168 See Implementation of the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. at 8491.
169 See id. at 8490.
17 0 See Greene, supra note 156, at 2; see also Submission, supra note 16, at 6 (noting the
credible danger of rape if Anikwata is deported).
171 Implementation of the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. at 8490.
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to the reservations and understandings of the resolution ratifying the
Convention.' 72 In its resolution, Congress defined "torture' as "the meaning
given the term in section 2340(1) of title 18, United State Code, and
includes the use of rape 173 and other forms of sexual violence."' 174
The application of the latter two requirements of the Convention
Against Torture are less forceful, but still potentially favorable to Anikwata.
The Torture Convention, as codified by Congress and the INS, requires that
the torture be "by ...or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity."' 175 The Nigerian
government has not prohibited the tribal custom of forcible marriage and
marital rape is not a crime in Nigeria. 176 The Nigerian government imposes
no de facto obligation on its officials to prevent FGM or any obligation,
legal or otherwise, to proscribe forced polygamous marriages. Thus, it is
arguable that the Nigerian government "officially consents" to Anikwata's
punishment. 177 In addition, the Torture Convention (as codified by the INS)
requires that the public official have a "legal responsibility to intervene. 178
The INS interprets the 'legal duty' to be no 'less than what is required by
international law. ' 179 International agreements that protect women's and
children's rights' 80 invoke the INS standard and qualify Nigeria's inaction
as intentional acquiescence to torture.' 8'
172 See id.
173 A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights interpreted the Torture
Convention in finding that the rape of a Turkish woman constituted torture. See Deborah E.
Anker & Kimberly Dempsey, Comparative Refugee Law: Gender Asylum Claims In
Different Jurisdictions, BENDER'S IMMIGR. BuLL., 3, 14-15 (1998) (citing Aydin v Turkey,
No. 57/1996/676/866, available at <http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/>).
174 Torture Victims Relief Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-320, § 3, 112 Stat. 3016 (1998).
175 Implementation of the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. at 8490; see also
Torture Convention, supra note 3, pt. 1, art. 1(1).
176 See infra note 181 (noting that marital rape is not a crime in Nigeria). But see
Stephens, supra note 76, at 96 (noting that rape qualifies as torture under the Torture
Convention when the person committing the rape is acting under governmental authority).
177 The Nigerian government need not have knowledge of a specific act of torture on a
specific individual. See Kristen B. Rosati, Article 3 of the U.N. Convention Against Torture:
A Powerful Tool to Prevent Removal Just Became More Powerful, 4 BENDER'S IMMIGR.
BULL., 137, 141 (1999).
178 Implementation of the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. at 8491.
179 Rosati, supra note 158, at 538.
180 See supra note 63 (listing the same).
181 See Sklar, supra note 28, at 653 (noting increased support for the position that
government inaction to harmful private conduct should be considered subject to international
human rights treaty protections). While Nigerian law does not recognize marital rape as a
crime, rape is a recognized crime in international law. See HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 82, at 57; Stephens, supra note 76, at 95-96; see also Morton Sklar, Implications of the
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The Torture Convention requires that "it is more likely than not that
[the applicant] would be tortured."' 182 While the regulation's language only
deals with the possibility of future torture, the INS assesses all relevant
evidence "including ... past torture."183 Although Anikwata was an infant
when she underwent FGM, there is no requirement that the torture remain
the same kind last experienced by the petitioner. A different form of torture
- including forceable polygamy, rape, and psychological separation from
one's only living immediate family member - would apply to Anikwata
today. The INS must also consider the applicant's ability to relocate to a
different part of the country. 84 This factor cuts in Anikwata's favor because
(1) Anikwata's in-laws have a monetary incentive to find Anikwata and
Sharon and (2) Anikwata must live with her in-laws because she has no
other means of support. 1
85
Despite the various legal arguments justiflying why Anikwata should
prevail on a Torture Convention claim, her petition will likely fail. Whether
Anikwata's arguments rely on the Torture Convention or asylum law, the
INS must still weigh the risk that her case could make entrance into the
United States much easier for illegal immigrants previously unprotected.
186
The problem of "opening the floodgates" exists whether the argument is
brought under the Torture Convention, asylum law, or any other
framework. The Torture Convention will probably fail for the same reasons
that the asylum claim would have failed - fear of a flood of new
immigrants. 187
New Implementing Statute and Regulations on Convention Against Torture Protections, 76
INTERPRETER RELEASES 265, 274 (1999) (noting that Nigeria's acquiescence in the Anikwata
case was demonstrated by (1) Nigeria's failure to deter FGM in comparison to other African
countries and (2) the high percentage of women in Anikwata's in-laws' tribe who have been
subject to FGM").
182 Withholding of Removal Under Section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Act and Withholding of
Removal Under the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8488, 8489 (1999) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.16)(emphasis supplied).
183 Id. "If a person has been tortured in the past and is being returned to the same country.
that past torture is certainly strong evidence that the individual will be tortured again if the
human rights conditions in the country have not changed appreciably." Rosati, supra note
158, at 543; see also Sklar, supra note 28, at 655.
184 Withholding of Removal Under Section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Act and Withholding of
Removal Under the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. at 8489.
185 See text supra accompanying notes 136-67.
186 See All Things Considered: Asylum and Genital Mutilation, supra note 8 (quoting
Immigration Law expert Stephen Lagomsky as stating that Anikwata's case could invite
claims based on all kinds of potential harms to children). But see infra text accompanying
note 188 (explaining that the INS fears are unwarranted because few women can escape their
home countries).
187 The number of asylum cases in 1993 was seventy-eight times greater than in 1973. See
Federation for American Immigration Reform, Illegal Immigration: It's Not About Just the
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Judges and legislators, however, should not allow fear of an
immigration flood to dissuade them from granting Anikwata's petition.
Most women in FGM-practicing countries cannot escape their home
countries.188 When they do escape to the United States, immigration
procedures should not force them back to a society that treats them as
second-class citizens.
VI. CONCLUSION
Anikwata fears for her daughter's subjugation to FGM. Separation of
this mother-daughter family will cause substantial emotional harm to both
family members. Anikwata and Sharon fear undergoing forced marriages
and becoming Anikwata's in-laws' property. Taken as a whole, the law's
consideration of these factors failed to protect Anikwata under the INA.
Virginia Anikwata, indeed, finds herself in a "Sophie's Choice" 89
predicament. Leaving her daughter alone in the United States or taking her
to Nigeria to undergo FGM are not viable options for any mother. The only
ideal resolution involves permitting them both to live together permanently
in the United States.
In review, four conclusions have been drawn. First, by withholding
Anikwata's deportation, the United States does not impose its own agenda
on Nigeria. Rather, the United States recognizes the dangers of FGM and
reaffirms its commitments to advancing women and children's rights.
Second, U.S. asylum law would not have protected Anikwata because the
Kasinga Board intentionally crafted its decision to avoid application to
cases like Anikwata's. Third, although the extreme nature of Anikwata's
case might have satisfied the new Cancellation standard for a suspension of
deportation, the overly-strict IIRAIRA prevented Anikwata from pursuing a
suspension remedy. Finally, while Anikwata could meet the standards
Border (visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http://www.fairus.orghtml/04135705.htm>. "With more
than a million illegal and legal immigrants settling in the United States each year,
immigration has an impact on education, health care, government budgets, employment, the
environment, crime and countless other areas of American life." Federation for American
Immigration Reform, Wat is the Federation for American Immigration Reform? (visited
Oct. 23, 1998) <http://www.fairus.org/fair.htm>. There are an estimated seventy thousand
illegal Nigerians in the United States while 3.6 million eligible people currently wait to be
admitted as immigrants to the United States, some of them having been on that list for
eighteen years. See Federation for American Immigration Reform, Illegal Aliens (visited
Oct. 23, 1998) <http://www.fairus.org/04118604.htm>.
188 See Pistone, supra note 5, at 509.
189 See WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE (1979) (telling the story of a mother at
Auschwitz who is ordered to select one of her children to be sent to the ovens while the other
is spared).
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outlined under the Torture Convention, the Board will likely deny
withholding of deportation out of fear of setting a dangerous precedent.'9
Legislators and the Board of Immigration Appeals should view this
case as an opportunity to rectify a significant weakness of U.S. immigration
law. Overly restrictive procedures reinforced by IIRAIRA do not
effectively address the humanitarian needs raised by cases like Anikwata's.
This case represents an opportunity to expand protections afforded by
gender-based asylum law. Decision-makers must recall that the United
States has openly outlawed FGM at home and condemned the practice
abroad. Such factors should encourage judges, the Board of Immigration
Appeals and the INS to allow applicants like Virginia Anikwata to avoid
the hardship of making a decision no parent should ever be forced to make.
190 See Greene, supra note 156, at 14 (quoting Sklar as stating that "the strong indication
we're getting is the INS is still taking the position of believing that Sharon should just stay
in the U.S").
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